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Abstract: Predicting cognitive politicization variables (i.e. political interest and internal 
political efficacy) often relies on the same models that predict political behavior. However, 
social psychology researchers have discovered further determinants, in particular with 
regard to minority groups: collective identities, which may be moderated or mediated by 
collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy. Therefore, this article considers 
these variables as predictors of cognitive politicization. Following this line of research, it 
may thus be assumed that both an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group as well as 
a national identification with the country of residence positively relate to cognitive 
politicization with respect to minority groups. A dual identification with both the in-group 
and the country of residence should be a positive predictor of these variables, whereas a 
separatist identification as member of the in-group but non-identification with the country 
of residence should be a negative predictor. These hypotheses are examined using an 
online panel sample of Turkish migrants in Germany. Although a separatist identification 
yields negative effects, the other hypotheses are not supported. Conversely, identification 
with Germany shows negative effects on both criteria. The findings are discussed with 
particular respect to the importance of sociopolitical integration of migrants. 
 
Keywords: collective identity, collective maltreatment, Germany, internal political efficacy, 
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Introduction 
 
For current democracies, the participation of citizens in politics, and particularly of 
socially disadvantaged people such as immigrants, is important for the legitimacy of 
political decision-making. It is also commonly understood that people who are 
more interested in politics and who feel more able to influence political decisions 
are more politically active. Predicting these cognitive politicization variables (i.e. 
political interest and internal political efficacy) often relies on the same models that 
predict political behavior. However, social psychology researchers have discovered 
further determinants, in particular with regard to minority groups: collective 
identities which may be moderated or mediated by collective maltreatment and 
perceived collective efficacy (e.g., Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 
2008). Therefore, these variables may also predict cognitive politicization variables. 
By using a panel sample of Turkish migrant1 students in Germany, this article 
consequently asks whether collective identities are predictors of political interest 
and/or internal political efficacy and, thus, might indirectly affect political behavior. 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
 
Models that predict political interest and political efficacy often rely on the 
same variables that predict political behavior which, at the individual level, is 
typically explained by the existence of demographics (e.g., age, gender), resources 
(e.g., status, income), or social capital (esp. social networks); by the political values 
and attitudes of individuals; and by political interest and efficacy (cf. Steinbrecher, 
2009). Biological variables like, for instance, personality traits (e.g., Mondak, 
Hibbing, Canache, Seligson & Anderson, 2010) or genetics (e.g., Fowler, Baker & 
Dawes, 2008; Hatemi, Medland, Morley, Heath & Martin, 2007) have also been 
taken into consideration for the explanation of political participation, but are less 
relevant for the present study. 
Countless studies have demonstrated that especially political interest – 
often defined as the “degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity” (van 
Deth, 1990, p. 278) and which comprises political awareness or attentiveness (cf. 
                                                          
1
The term “migrant” is used to refer to both first-generation immigrants and their 
descendants (i.e., immigrant-origin individuals). 
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Zaller, 1992) – and internal political efficacy, i.e. the feeling that one is capable to 
understand political facts and processes and to take political influence (cf. Almond 
& Verba, 1965; Balch, 1974; Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954) influence (socially 
accepted) political participation in a positive way (e.g., Finkel, 1985; Gabriel, 2004; 
Hadjar & Becker, 2006; 2007; Krampen, 2000). 
In addition to the mentioned “traditional” predictors, however, social 
psychology researchers have discovered further determinants of political 
participation: collective identities, which may be moderated or mediated by 
collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy (e.g., Simon, 2004; van 
Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Collective identity means the individual’s sense 
of belonging to a group or a community. It is based on subjectively shared 
characteristics and “provides categories by which individuals divide up and make 
sense of the social world” (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 298). Usually, collective 
identities emerge in groups and through interaction, and Tajfel states that 
collective identities also have action potential when he writes that social is an 
“intervening causal mechanism in situations of ‘objective’ social change” (Tajfel, 
1978, p. 86). 
The work of Simon and his colleagues provides a significant amount of 
empirical evidence for the importance of collective identities in collective action, 
while also addressing the role of a dual identification with the aggrieved in-group 
and a more inclusive, higher-level community, such as the society as a whole (e.g., 
Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon, Reichert & Grabow, 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; 
Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a; 2004b). Several studies also suggest 
that national identification is positively related to political interest and internal 
political efficacy (e.g., Cohrs, 2003; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 
1999). Shingles (1981), for instance, finds that “black consciousness” fosters 
political distrust and political efficacy among Blacks in America, while no such 
correlation exists for disadvantaged white people. 
According to Stürmer and Simon’s (2004a) dual-pathway model, collective 
identification should be part of an affective, or automated, path to politicization. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that collective identities correlate stronger with 
political interest than with internal political efficacy (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004, for 
affective vs. reflective pathways to social behavior). Moreover, it may be assumed 
that both an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group as well as a national 
identification with the country of residence are positively related to political 
interest and internal political efficacy in the case of ethno-cultural minority groups. 
A dual identification with the in-group and the country of residence could also be a 
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positive predictor of these variables, according to the politicized collective identity 
model from Simon and Klandermans (2001). On the other hand, a separatist 
identification as member of the in-group but simultaneous non-identification with 
the higher-level community (i.e. the country of residence) should be a negative 
predictor, as it may either work depoliticizing or radicalizing. Collective 
maltreatment and efficacy may, however, be mediators or moderators of collective 
identities, and in particular of a dual identity. 
 
Sample and Method 
Sample 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study utilizes data from an 
online panel of university students with a Turkish migration history in Germany. 
These students completed online questionnaires between 2009 (independent 
variables; t1) and 2011 (dependent variables; tP [P for panel]). The focus is on 
university students because student life typically provides numerous opportunities 
for politicization. Moreover, university students with a migration history might 
have comparatively better chances of exerting influence and leadership in the 
political arena in the future compared to less educated members of their ethno-
cultural in-group. Hence, investigation into their politicization should thus provide 
crucial insights into the social psychological determinants of politicization among 
migrants. 
All questionnaires used for this study were written in German and were 
completed by 463 students initially. For 189 students and 186 students, 
respectively, data for political interest and internal political efficacy, respectively, 
were available from subsequent measurements. In the following, aggregated 
scores (i.e. mean values of the variables across subsequent surveys) will be used as 
dependent measures.2 
Dependent and Independent Measurers 
Political interest was always measured by the item “How interested are you in 
politics?” (0 = not at all … 4 = very strongly; M = 2.48, SD = 1.16)3, and internal 
political efficacy via three items (0 = not true at all … 4 = absolutely true): “I am able 
to understand and evaluate major policy issues”, “I know a lot about politics and 
political issues”, and “I feel capable of actively participating in the political 
process.” (M = 2.34, SD = 1.01; Cronbach’s α = .85) 
                                                          
2
 For more details on the method, please consult Reichert (2013). 
3
 All statistics given in this section refer to the initial survey in 2009. 
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Questions that had already performed well in previous studies were used to 
measure collective identifications (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). 
The participants usually indicated their choice on a five point scale (0 = do not 
agree at all ... 4 = completely agree). In particular, ethno-cultural identification with 
Turks was measured using four items: “I feel strong ties with other Turks,” “To be 
of Turkish origin is an important aspect of my person,” “In general I am glad that I 
am of Turkish origin,” and “I identify with other Turks.” (M = 2.34, SD = 1.02; 
Cronbach’s α = .82) 
Identification with Germany was measured by five items: “I feel strong ties 
with Germany,” “To live in Germany is an important aspect of my person,” “In 
general I am glad to live in Germany,” “I identify with Germany,” and “I feel part of 
German society.” (M = 2.55, SD = 0.93; Cronbach’s α = .85) 
Furthermore, four items were used to measure dual identification as both 
Turkish and German: “I feel I belong to both the Turks and the Germans,” 
“Sometimes I feel more as a German and sometimes more as a Turk – it depends 
on the situation”, “I have many similarities with Germans as well as Turks,” and “I 
feel well in the Turkish as well as the German culture.” (M = 2.34, SD = 0.98; 
Cronbach’s α = .72) 
Three items measured separatist identification as Turkish in opposition to 
identification as German. The first two items were: “I often feel more Turkish than 
German” and “All in all I feel more Turkish than German.” In addition, respondents 
were presented a horizontal sequence of eleven boxes. Each box contained 
complementary percentages for Turkish and German ranging from 100% Turkish, 
0% German to 0% Turkish, 100% German (with a decrement of 10% for Turkish and 
an increment of 10% for German), and they were asked to what percentage they 
felt Turkish and to what percentage German. Respondents then ticked the 
appropriate box, and their responses were coded from 10 to 0 such that higher 
scores indicate stronger identification as Turkish as opposed to German. To 
calculate a single index the scores from the box measure were translated into 
scores between 0 and 4 (by multiplying the original scores with 0.40) (M = 2.40, 
SD = 1.21; Cronbach’s α = .89). 
 
Control Variables, Mediators and Moderators 
In addition, socio-demographic control variables were measured in order to 
be included in the statistical analyses: sex (59% women, 41% men), age (M = 25 
years, SD = 4.57), German citizenship (55% no vs. 45% yes), percentage of lifetime 
spent in Germany (M = 84, SD = 30), monthly net income (M = 452 Euro, SD = 396); 
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and German language proficiency was measured on a five-point scale (0 = very bad 
... 4 = very good; M = 3.72, SD = 0.64). The political behavior that the students 
engaged in before the first measurement was also considered as a control variable. 
The respondents ticked a yes-box for each activity in which they had participated. 
Eight activities were summed to an index, namely: contacted a politician, actively 
supported a political party’s election campaign, member of a political party, signed 
a petition, engaged in a citizens’ initiative, distributed leaflets, boycotted products 
for political or ethical reasons, and attended a legal demonstration. Eventually, 
religiosity was also measured by the same scale as collective identifications, 
because these variables might be correlated with each other (Foner & Alba, 2008; 
Saroglou & Galand, 2004): “I am a religious person” and “My faith is important to 
me.” (M = 2.38, SD = 1.47; r = .82, p < .001) 
Eventually, potential mediator and moderator variables resulting from 
social psychological research and theory were included in the questionnaires (e.g., 
Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Collective maltreatment was measured by four items 
(0 = do not agree at all ... 4 = completely agree): “Turks are often treated badly in 
Germany,” “If it were up to some Germans, the rights of the Turks living here 
would be further restricted,” “I am angry about the treatment of the Turks in 
Germany” and “The discrimination against the Turks living here often makes me 
furious” (M = 2.31, SD = 1.02; Cronbach’s α = .87). The questionnaire employed two 
items to measure collective efficacy (0 = do not agree at all ... 4 = completely 
agree): “I believe that the Turks living here can exert influence on political decisions 
in Germany” and “If the Turks living in Germany acted as a group, they could 
successfully fight against their maltreatment.” (M = 2.31, SD = 1.02; r = .33, 
p < .001) 
 
Predictors of Political Interest and Internal Political Efficacy 
 
Bivariate Analyses 
Table 1 presents the bivariate correlations between collective identities and 
political interest and internal political efficacy, respectively. All correlations are 
rather weak, but in most cases in the direction we would expect, with an emphasis 
on the negative correlations between a separatist identification and both 
dependent variables. Moreover, only these correlations were (marginally) 
significant. 
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Table 1: Pearson correlations between collective identities (t1) and cognitive 
politicization (tP) 
 ID Germany ID Turks Separatist ID Dual ID 
Political interest .10 .04 -.05◊ .07 
Internal political 
efficacy 
.09 -.04 -.12◊ .09 
Note. Only two marginally significant correlations occurred (◊: p < .10). 
Multiple Regression Analyses 
Consequently, multiple regression analyses were employed in order to see whether 
these patterns might change if we control for background variables. We were 
interested in the additional contribution of collective identifications to standard 
predictors of politicization. Therefore, socio-demographic variables, religiosity and 
past political behavior as well as either political interest (if efficacy was the 
criterion) or internal political efficacy (if interest was the criterion) were included in 
a first step. In a second step, all four collective identifications were entered. The 
corresponding variable of cognitive politicization as measured at time one was 
included in a final step (e.g., t1 political interest was included if tP political interest 
was the criterion). This last step would allow to predict changes in the criteria 
(Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Granger, 1969; 1988).4 The results are presented in Table 
2. 
 Mediation and Moderation Analyses 
Previous analyses yielded only weak evidence for the statistical relevance of 
collective identifications in the emergence of cognitive politicization, in particular 
with regard to political interest. Therefore, another model included collective 
maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy as potential mediators and 
moderators. If either of these or both variables were statistically significant 
predictors of cognitive politicization in the fourth step, a statistical test of 
mediation was conducted5. Interaction variables of z-standardized predictors were 
considered in a fifth step to test for moderated effects (cf. Aiken & West, 2003; 
Frazier, Tix & Barron, 2004). One interaction variable was used for each 
identification variable, but these were entered separately for each potential 
                                                          
4
Additional steps in causal analysis were also applied as suggested by these authors. 
5
In cases of significant mediators, the “Indirect Macro” by Hayes for SPSS was used (Version 
4.1, 21 January 2011; cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 5000 bootstrap samples. 
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moderator. Moderated regression analyses were only conducted for significant 
interactions using median splits. 
Table 2: Multiple regression analyses – cognitive politicization (tP) on collective 
identities (t1) 
 Political interest Internal political efficacy 
 β t p β t p 
Age .05 0.84 .404 .07 1.27 .206 
Sex (female/male) .11 2.17 .032 .16 3.17 .002 
Income .00 0.06 .956 -.04 -0.67 .503 
Percentage of lifetime spent in 
Germany 
.09 1.45 .149 .08 1.24 .217 
German Citizenship (no/yes) -.07 -1.37 .172 -.05 -1.03 .305 
German language proficiency -.02 -0.28 .781 .02 0.41 .680 
Religiosity .05 0.87 .386 .12 1.94 .054 
Past political behavior .06 0.99 .325 .17 2.88 .004 
Political interest .64 8.84 .000 .23 3.18 .002 
Internal political efficacy .12 1.71 .090 .49 6.79 .000 
Identification with Germany -.10 -1.57 .119 -.20 -3.19 .002 
Identification with Turks .01 0.16 .872 -.04 -0.59 .558 
Separatist identification -.11 -1.42 .157 -.19 -2.44 .016 
Dual identification .01 0.12 .908 .06 1.11 .270 
Df (R2) [R2adj] 171 (.611) [.579] 168 (.627) [.596] 
 
 
Political Interest 
Collective maltreatment had a marginally positive effect on political interest 
(β = .10, t(169) = 1.85, p = .066; model step: F(2,169) = 2.01, p = .137; R2 = .62, 
R2adj = .58).
6 Mediation analyses revealed a corresponding mediation of 
identification with Germany (B = -0.04, SE = 0.03, CI [-0.11|-0.00]), that is, the latter 
affected collective maltreatment (B = -0.33, SE = 0.10, p < .001), which then passed 
on this effect (Figure 2). No additional mediation was found nor was any 
interaction included in the fifth step significant, and collective efficacy was also not 
a significant predictor of political interest. 
                                                          
6
 Significant coefficients given in this chapter refer to the level α ≤ .10. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the interaction effect between identification with 
Germany and collective efficacy in the prediction of cognitive 
politicization. 
However, if each interaction variable was included separately in the fifth step, then 
collective efficacy moderated the effect of separatist identification as depicted in 
Figure 1 (B = -0.12, SE = 0.06, p = .045; model step: F(1,168) = 4.09, p = .045; 
R2 = .63, R2adj = .59): According to a median split
7, a separatist identification was 
statistically irrelevant for low collective efficacy (β = -.13, t(70) = -0.98, p = .330; t1 
political interest: β = .46, t(70) = 3.89, p < .001; model fit: F(15,70) = 9.49, p < .001; 
R2 = .67, R2adj = .60). On the contrary, highly efficacious respondents reported 
higher political interest the less separatist they identified themselves 
(β = -.22,t(84) = -2.00, p = .049; t1 political interest: β = .77, t(84) = 7.64, p < .001; 
collective maltreatment: β = .17, t(84) = 2.40, p = .019; model fit: F(15,84) = 10.35, 
p < .001; R2 = .65, R2adj = .59). The causal control analysis yielded no significance for 
political interest as a predictor of separatist identification (β = -.10, t(84) = -1.06, 
p = .294), indicating that the identified moderated effect of a separatist 
identification was a causal one. 
Internal Political Efficacy 
A similar pattern was found in the mediation analysis for internal political efficacy 
(Figure 2). Only collective maltreatment was a significant predictor in the fourth 
step (β = .13, t(166) = 2.34, p = .020; model step: F(2,166) = 2.77, p = .065; R2 = .64, 
R2adj = .60), and the effect of identification with Germany was mediated by that 
                                                          
7
Low collective efficacy ≤ 2 vs. high collective efficacy > 2. 
Separatist 
Identification
Cognitive 
Politicization
(High) 
Collective 
Efficacy
–
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variable (B = -0.04, SE = 0.02, CI [-0.10|-0.01]; path from identification with 
Germany to collective maltreatment: B = -0.32, SE = 0.10, p = .001). However, the 
direct effect of identification with Germany did still persist (β = -.17, t(166) = -2.55, 
p = .012). 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the mediation effect of identification with Germany, 
mediated by collective maltreatment on cognitive politicization 
(identification with Germany kept its direct effect in the regression on 
internal political efficacy). 
In addition, moderation analyses also yielded a statistically significant 
interaction between collective maltreatment and an identification with Germany 
(B = -.14, SE = 0.06, p = .024; model step: F(2,162) = 1.46, p = .218; R2 = .65, 
R2adj = .61). The median split
8 indicated that the latter was of no statistical 
relevance for students who felt less maltreated (β = -.12, t(75) = -1.36, p = .177; sex: 
β = .19, t(75) = 2.57, p = .012; past political behavior: β = .20, t(75) = 2.19, p = .032; 
political interest: β = .27, t(75) = 2.11, p = .038; t1 internal political efficacy: β = .39, 
t(75) = 3.08, p = .003; model fit: F(15,75) = 9.06, p < .001; R2 = .64, R2adj = .57). Those 
who felt that their in-group was quite maltreated, however, tended to be less 
politically efficacious the more they identified with Germany (β = -.21, t(76) = -1.86, 
p = .066; political interest: β = .22, t(76) = 2.10, p = .039; t1 internal political efficacy: 
β = .53, t(76) = 5.18, p < .001; model fit: F(15,76) = 7.87, p < .001; R2 = .61, 
R2adj = .53). Political efficacy was not a significant predictor in the causal control 
regression analysis on identification with Germany as a criterion (β = -.01, 
                                                          
8
 Low collective maltreatment < 2.5 vs. high collective maltreatment ≥ 2.5. 
Identification 
with Germany
Cognitive 
Politicization
Collective 
Maltreatment
–
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t(76) = -0.07, p = .949), so that we may conclude that we did indeed find a long-
term effect of identification with Germany on internal political efficacy in the event 
of high perceived maltreatment of their Turkish in-group. 
Similar to the regression on political interest, we did not find any significant 
interaction between collective efficacy and collective identities if these were 
included simultaneously in the fifth step. However, if each interaction variable was 
included in a separate model as a single predictor, the interaction with 
identification with Germany was marginally significant (B = 0.08, SE = 0.05, p = .095; 
model step: F(1,165) = 2.82, p = .095; R2 = .65, R2adj = .61). The interaction with 
separatist identification was statistically significant (B = -0.11, SE = 0.05, p = .032; 
model step: F(1,165) = 4.70, p = .032; R2 = .65, R2adj = .61; see Figure 1). Split 
analyses showed that an identification with Germany was a negative predictor of 
internal political efficacy among respondents with low collective efficacy (β = -.24, 
t(68) = -2.26, p = .027), whereas a separatist identification was insignificant among 
these students (β = -.18, t(68) = -1.47, p = .147; sex: β = .17, t(68) = 2.34, p = .023; 
religiosity: β = .19, t(68) = 2.36, p = .021; past political behavior: β = .21, 
t(68) = 2.56, p = .013; t1 internal political efficacy: β = .57, t(68) = 5.53, p < .001; 
model fit: F(15,68) = 12.10, p < .001; R2 = .73, R2adj = .67). The “Granger test” did not 
yield a significant coefficient for identification with Germany on internal political 
efficacy (β = -.03, t(68) = -0.22, p = .825). Hence, identification with Germany 
predicted decreases in internal political efficacy among students with low collective 
efficacy. 
In contrast, a separatist identification had a significant, negative effect on 
political efficacy among students who felt more collectively efficacious (β = -.25, 
t(83) = -2.11, p = .038), while this time it was the identification with Germany which 
did not yield any significance (β = -.06, t(83) = -0.62, p = .541; political interest: 
β = .28, t(83) = 2.66, p = .009; t1 internal political efficacy: β = .37, t(83) = 3.39, 
p = .001; collective maltreatment: β = .23, t(83) = 3.05, p = .003; model fit: 
F(15,83) = 8.92, p < .001; R2 = .62, R2adj = .55). Political efficacy was not a significant 
predictor in the causal control regression analysis on separatist identification 
(β = 07, t(83) = 0.77, p = .444), indicating that a separatist identification reduced 
internal political efficacy if students felt that they were efficacious as a group. 
 
Summary 
To sum up, collective maltreatment appeared to mediate the influence of 
an identification with Germany with respect to political interest and internal 
political efficacy (at least partially): Identification with Germany was negatively 
 
How Collective Identities Affect Political Interest 
JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015 
 
13 
 
correlated with collective maltreatment which itself was a positive predictor of 
both cognitive politicization variables. This means that the more students identified 
with Germany, the less they felt maltreated as a group, and as a consequence, they 
were less interested in politics and felt less politically efficacious. On the other 
hand, this also implies that the less students identified with Germany, the more 
they felt that Turks were maltreated in Germany, which translated into more 
interest in politics and a stronger sense of political efficacy. However, with respect 
to the latter, an identification with Germany still retained its direct negative effect: 
the more respondents identified with Germany, the less did these individuals feel 
politically efficacious. 
Even though collective maltreatment was a significant mediator, it was 
almost irrelevant in the moderation analyses. In contrast, collective efficacy was a 
significant moderator: A separatist identification had a negative effect on both 
criteria given a high amount of collective efficacy, whereas an identification with 
Germany resulted in decreases in internal political efficacy if students felt that their 
collective was less efficacious. This means that those students who thought that 
Turks in Germany had quite some influence and that they could fight maltreatment 
against Turks if they acted as a collective were less interested in politics and felt 
less politically efficacious as individuals the more separatist they identified 
themselves. On the contrary, students who held the opinion that their in-group was 
not effective as a collective were politically more interested and efficacious the less 
they identified with Germany. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
According to the first hypothesis, collective identities should have stronger 
correlations with political interest than internal political efficacy. This was not 
supported by multiple regression analyses, although more complex models yielded 
that collective identities may not merely have an effect on internal political efficacy 
but also on political interest. 
Identification with Germany 
In accordance with social psychological research, perceived maltreatment 
of one’s own collective and the collective’s efficacy as a group are important (e.g., 
Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Mediation analyses yielded 
that students felt higher levels of maltreatment of their ethno-cultural in-group the 
less they identified with Germany, and the more maltreated they felt as a 
collective, the more were they interested in politics. Maybe students with Turkish 
migration history pursue an individualized strategy of success, and the more they 
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identify with Germany, are well in Germany and do not perceive deprivation and 
maltreatment of their collective in Germany, the less there is reason to be 
interested in politics or to gather information about politics and policies. 
Another consequence of an identification with the majority might be lower 
levels of internal political efficacy, although the mechanism seems more complex in 
this case. The direct, negative effect of identification with Germany on internal 
political efficacy may contradict research according to which a national 
identification with the majority supports politicization (e.g., Huddy & Khatib, 2007) 
– this might not be applicable in the context of immigration when individuals may 
hold multiple (national or ethno-cultural) identities, in particular when we also 
think of the non-effect in the regression on political interest. Moreover, we found 
the same mediation as with respect to political interest, but the direct effect of 
identification with Germany remained. However, moderation analyses revealed 
that this effect persisted only among two groups of students: those who felt that 
their group was maltreated, and those who perceived their in-group as hardly 
effective as a collective. Hence, the combination with perceived collective 
maltreatment and/or collective efficacy could explain the politicizing effect of an 
identification with the majority out-group. 
 
Separatist Identification 
A separatist identification was a negative predictor of political efficacy. This 
is exactly what we hypothesized, but we also expected a direct effect on political 
interest. However, detailed analyses revealed that a separatist identification was a 
negative predictor for both measures of cognitive politicization only if students had 
the feeling that their in-group was highly efficacious as a collective. Hence, when it 
subjectively seems particularly likely to be able to achieve something as a 
collective, a separatist identification causes cognitive depoliticization. 
Since a separatist identification and the strategy of social demarcation from 
the majority or “host society” go with each other (see Berry 2001; Esser 1999), this 
could also imply that classical interest in politics and a general sense of political 
efficacy are indeed reduced. At the same time, however, the interest in one’s own 
in-group persists and individuals distance themselves from politics insofar as they 
hold the view that they would not need politics, because the representatives of 
their in-group would successfully care about the advancement of their own group. 
Such a combination could be linked with a particular contempt for and disinterest 
in the broader societal context: “What do I care what you do; we can still take care 
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of ourselves.” In sum, this form of collective identification is particularly 
disadvantageous for politicization. 
 
Other Collective Identities 
Our analyses did not yield evidence that either ethno-cultural identification 
with Turks or a dual identification with both, Germany and Turks, would operate 
politicizing. This result did not change when we inspected the effects of collective 
maltreatment and collective efficacy as potential mediators or moderators. Hence, 
this study also adds to research on dual identification as a politicized collective 
identity and suggests that existing theory (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon 
& Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010) may only apply to political behavior, but not 
to cognitive politicization. Other research, however, indicates that social capital – 
especially being involved in certain social networks – could be more relevant with 
respect to cognitive politicization (Reichert, 2013), and future research should also 
think about other boundary conditions such as the salience of anti-immigrant 
policies and the identification with those who fight to change these policies (Wiley, 
Figueroa & Lauricella, 2014). 
Concluding Remarks 
Social-psychological research on identity supplies a complementary 
contribution to the explanation of cognitive politicization. Although findings for the 
role of collective identities in the behavioral politicization and in social movement 
participation cannot be applied to cognitive politicization in the same way, existing 
research could be enriched with important insights. Only our hypothesis on the 
negative effects of a separatist identification was supported by our data, whereas 
we did not expect a negative effect of an identification with Germany. Moreover, 
neither an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group nor a dual identification 
operated in the way which we had expected. 
It should be noted that aspects of politics and policies regarding the in-
group cannot be neglected when aiming at bringing about a politically interested 
and competent citizenry. This holds in particular once we consider the negative 
effects of an identification with Germany in the multiple regression analyses when 
several control variables were included and which also accounted for the fact that 
various collective identities are involved in the context of immigration. 
Furthermore, the political system has to respect the origin of all people because 
the bond with the minority in-group that plays a certain role for acquiring the 
preconditions of political participation within the larger society. 
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However, since internal political efficacy is more often affected by collective 
identification, it seems that the more conventional political activities are influenced 
by collective identities in an indirect way (cf. Reichert, 2013). Politics thus must not 
preach either / or and request sole identification with Germany but accept that this 
kind of identity may not in all contexts.be as positive for engaging people in politics 
as some research suggests. Yet a very one-sided form of a separatist collective 
identification in fact appears to be a negative condition of cognitive politicization, 
which is often understood as a precondition of an active participation in politics. At 
least university students do not seem to politicize cognitively the more they 
identify with the majority out-group, or the more they identify with their in-group 
in a very single-sided way. 
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